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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OIF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEARA ANN DEVEREAUX, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, 
a corporation, and HAROLD J. 
McKEEVER, 
Defendants arnd Respondents. 
Case No. 
8472 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The preliminary statement as contained in the brief 
of appellant is accurate and acceptable to respondent. 
Also, the statement of the case is reasonably accu-
rate, and, in the interest of expediency, we will not 
attempt to repeat such statement but shall only call the 
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attention of this Court to certain additional facts of 
serious import. 
The locale of the accident involved was Highway 
U.S. 91, which is the primary highway between Salt Lake 
City and Provo, Utah. (Par. III of Plaintiff's complaint.) 
The highway is of multiple lanes (See Ex. 1, 2, 3, 4) and 
is heavily traveled (R. 20). There is no intersection at 
this place and the accident occurred within a range of 75 
feet to 100 feet (R. 14) of the crest of a hill. The slope 
of the hill was downward to the north. There was no 
visibility from the place of impact over the crest (R. 14). 
At the time of commencing her "U" turn plaintiff 
testified that she looked in both directions but that she 
saw no car that was close and that she ne-\er saw the 
vehicle that was being driven northward and stopped by 
the witness Breeze (R. 62 and 85), although this witness 
stopped for Officer Allred and \\as stopped in the center 
lane as plaintiff commenced her '' U'' turn. Plaintiff, at 
time of impact, was in the lane of travel "hich was the 
second lane to the east from the center of the highway 
(R. 31 and 41-42). 
Plaintiff in her statement of facts takes due care to 
explain the use of an alcoholic be\erage by defendant 
McKeever. It should be carefully noted that intoxication 
'vas not an issue in the case submitted to the jury nor 
has any appeal been taken from the failure to submit any 
such issue. We can only construe this is an attempt to 
influence this Court on a non-existent issue and irrelevant 
matter as far as this appeal is concerned. 
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Therefore, it is nec.essary that this Court consider 
the foregoing discussion of facts in conjunction with 
those set forth ·by appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DENIED HER RIGHT 
TO A JURY TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE CON-
STITUTION AND APPLICABLE AUTHORITIES. 
POINT II 
IT IS ADMITTED THAT THERE WAS EVI-
DENCE INTRODUCED WHICH WOULD SUPPORT 
A FINDING THAT DEFENDANTS WERE NEGLI-
GENT IN THE OPERATION OF THE AUTOMOBILE 
AND THAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY 
CAUSED PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES. 
Plaintiff, in this appeal, argues two matters that are 
not germain to the issues raised by the appeal, namely, 
(a) the sufficiency of the evidence of plaintiff to estab-
lish the negligence of defendant; and (b) an alleged 
error of the trial court in giving instruction No. 5, as 
argued by plaintiff commencing at page 16 of the brief. 
The order granting the motion of defendant for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict was upon the ground 
of contributory negligence of plaintiff, as preserved and 
argued by defendant in his motion to dismiss at the con-
clusion of plaintiff's case, and in the motion for directed 
verdict at the conclusion of the entire case, both of which 
motions were taken under advisement by the trial court. 
(R. 182, 192 and 195.) For the purposes of those motions 
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and the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
the sufficiency of the evidence to establish negligence of 
defendant was assumed. It was just a question as to 
whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent. Why 
plaintiff on this appeal argues a matter with reference 
tp which there is no longer an issue in the case is not 
understandable, unless plaintiff hopes thereby to draw 
a red herring across the path of this court to divert its 
attention from the real issue, namely, the conduct of 
plaintiff in making a '' U'' turn across a busy highway 
just over the brow of a. hill where the view of oncoming 
traffic was limited to a distance too short within which 
to stop. 
Plaintiff made no motion for new trial on the ground 
of its alleged error in giving Instruction No. 5; the cor-
rectness of the instruction was not before the trial court 
upon the motion of defendant for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict; and is not now before this court 
for review. This is another red herring and has no place 
in the appeal. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
DEFEN.DANTS' MOTION SETTING ASIDE THE 
VERDICT OF THE JURY .A.ND ENTERING JUDG-
MENrr FOR THE DEFENDANTS, NO CAUSE OF 
ACTION. 
As hereinbefore indicated, the sole issue on this 
appeal is the determination of the contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff as a matter of law. A review of the 
decisions of this Court leave little doubt as to the pro-
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priety · of the ruling of the trial court. 
Cederloff v. Whited, 110 Utah 45, 169 Pac. 2d 777. 
This case has been cited and construed on several occa-
sions with approval. This decision involved a defendant 
who was makjng a left turn c~lliding plaintiff's vehicle 
approaching from the opposite direction. This Court, 
through Jus tic~ Wade, stated : 
"Section 57-7-133, U.C.A. 1943, provides: '(a) 
No person shall turn a vehicle from a direct course 
upon a highway unless and until such movement 
can be made with reasonable safety * * :J(•.' De-
fendant turned his car from a direct course· in the 
highway into the lane of traffic intended for 
vehicles traveling in the opposite direction at a 
time when plaintiff's car was approaching in such 
close proximity that the collision occurred as soon 
as the front end of defendant's car had reached 
a few feet into plaintiff's lane of traffic. Had 
plaintiff's car run into the rear end of defendant's 
car after the front end thereof had entirely crossed 
plaintiff's course of travel, there might have been 
some question whether the turn could he maqe 
with reasonable safety, but under the facts in this 
case it is clear that as a matter of law the turn 
could not be made with reasonable safety, and the 
. defendant was guilty of negligence. The defend-
ant's testimony that he looked and did not see any 
car coming .does not help his situation, because 
if he had paid attention to what was there to be 
seen he would have seen plaintiff's car coming, 
as it was approaching in the immediate vicinity, 
and there is no claim that it did not have proper 
lights. It is equally clear that such negligence of 
the defendant was at least one of the proximate 
causes of the accident. The accident was the im-
mediate and direct result of this negligence, and 
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without such negligence it would not have oc-
curred. 
''So under these circumstances plaintiff could 
not have avoided the accident, and defendant's 
negligence was as a matter of law the sole proxi-
mate cause of the collision and resulting injury 
and the court erred in not so instructing the jury.'' 
The decision not only held that the maneuvers of 
the defendant were negligent as a matter of law but fur-
ther held as a matter of law that such negligence was the 
sole proximate cause of the collision. 
The Cederloff case, supra, was followed by the case 
of Hart v. Kerr, 110 Utah 479, 175 Pac. 2d 475, which 
again was a case where a motorist was turning to the 
left side of a highway when an accident occurred. Again, 
through Justice Pratt this Court stated: 
''There seems to be rather an obvious conclu-
sion at which to arrive from the evidence. Plain-
tiff knew defendant was coming fast (he testified 
40 miles per hour) ; and plaintiff's automobile 
was hit in front of its center-the conclusion: 
Plaintiff took a chance upon a faulty estimate of 
distances and speed and lost. Considering the 
duty imposed upon plaintiff by section 57-7-133 
U.C.A., 1943, he clearlv was at fault. We invite 
attention to our recent decision of Cederloff v. 
Whited, Utah, 169 Pac. 2d ·777, ,,~here this section 
is discussed. In this case as in that the contact 
between the cars was such as to indicate that one 
party was too close at the speed he "~as going for 
the other to attempt a crossing. We are of the 
opinion that the principles of the Cederloff case 
are decisive of this case. The lower court properly 
directed a verdict of no cause of action.'' 
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See also Yeates v. Budge, ______ Utah ______ , 252 Pac. 2d 
220 and French v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 117 Utah 406, 
216 Pac. 2d 1002. 
Graham v. Roderick, 32 Wash. 2d 427, 202 Pac. 2d 
253, involved a collision when plaintiff was making a 
'' U'' turn in an intersection and that court in holding 
plaintiff negligent as a matter of law said: 
''A 'U' turn movement, executed at an inter-
section within a city, is at best a more or less 
hazardous operation, often requiring considerable 
skill and vigilance to be safely executed, because 
of the fact that the operator engaged in such 
maneuver must observe and contend with traffic 
approaching from four directions. 
"While both of the respondents in this in-
stance testified that they looked to their left before 
proceeding into the cross-traffic of the arterial 
highway, they did not see appellant's automobile 
approaching, although it was there to be seen, nor 
did they stop before proceeding across the ar-
terial. 
''Respondents' principal contention and reason 
why they did not stop for, and give the right of 
way to, appellant's vehicle is that its lights could 
not have been burning, since they looked and saw 
none. The trial court made no finding that appel-
lant's lights were not burning, although it did 
observe, in its memorandum opinion, that the 
lights 'may have been dim either from battery 
weakness or on low beam or on dimmers.' We can 
agree that such may have been the case, but, as 
appellant has pointed out, there is no evidence in 
the record to support any such theory. 
"Because of this fact, we are left with a situa-
tion where the only rule which can be applied is 
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that a party will be deemed to have obse_r~ed that 
which he necessarily would have seen If he had 
looked and will not he absolved of the charge of 
' . 
negligently having failed to look, by testrmony 
that he looked and did not see. Paddock: v~ Tone, 
25 Wn. (2d) 940, 172 P. (2d) 481; Stanley v. Allen, 
27 Wn. (2d) 770, 180 P. (2d) 90. '' 
Latndfair v. Capital Transit Co., 165 Fed. 2d 255, in-
volved a "U" turn. by plaintiff. The United States Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for Washington, D. C. used the 
following language in sustaining a directed verdict for 
the defendant.: 
"The facts giving -rise to the suit follow. In 
the early .evening of August 19, 1944, appellant 
was driving an automobile south on the west side 
of Fourteenth Street, in the Northwest section of 
the District of Columbia, and attempted a 'U' 
turn at a point north of Arkansas Avenue. This 
street is fifty feet wide, and traversing its center 
are two sets of streetcar tracks, one for north-
bound and the other for southbound traffic. Each 
set of tracks is four feet and eight inches wide 
with a 'dummy' space between of five feet and 
two inches. Appellant testified that she was travel~ 
ing at a slow rate of speed, that she looked to the 
south for oncoming traffic. and sa'v none, that she 
made the appropriate signal for her turn to fol-
lowing traffic, and then carefully attempted a 'U' 
turn and her automobile was struck broadside by 
a streetcar as she crossed the northbound tracks. 
She gave explicit testimony that her view to the 
south in the direction of the on-coming streetcar 
was sufficien tl ~,. good to a.llo"r her to see clearly 
as far as Shepherd Street, three blocks to the 
south of the point where the collision occurred. 
Appellant further testified that she looked to the 
south and saw no oncoming vehicles as late as that 
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time when she was crossing the 'dummy' space 
between the car tracks, not more than five feet 
from .the point of impact. 
''The fact of the collision produces the inevit-
able conclusion that appellant must have seen the 
oncoming streetcar if she actually looked in its 
direction. Northern Pacific R. Co. v~ Freeman, 
174 U. S. 379, 19 Sup. Ct. 763, 43 L. Ed. 1014; 
Miller v. Union Pa.r~ific R. Co., 290 U. S. 227, 54 
Sup. Ct. 172, 78 L. Ed. 285. The duty to look can-
not be questioned. Chicago R. I. & P. Railrod Co. 
v. Houston., 95 U.S. 697, 24 L. Ed. 542. Under com-
parable circumstances this court has previously 
rejected such testimony as that given by the ap-
pellant, declaring contributory negligence on the 
part of the injured person as a matter of law. 
Glaria v. Washington Southern R. Co., 30 App. 
D. C. 559; Faucett v. Bergmann, et al.,. 57 App. D. 
C. 290, 22 F. 2d 718. These rules apply where the 
plaintiff's case is based upon an allegation of last 
clear chance. W ashin.gton Ry. & Electric Co. v. 
Buscher, 54 App. D. C. 353, 298 F. 675." 
The principles involved were again repeated in the 
case of Capital Transit Company v. Hedin, 222 Fed. 2d 
41, as follows : 
"We conclude that under Maryland's statute 
and judicial decisions, it was Hedin's duty to yield 
the right of way to the bus approaching· on Ager 
Road, not only at the entrance to that highway, 
not only at the entrance to the second or north-
bound roadway, but also throughout his passage 
across the second roadway on which the bus was 
traveling. He cannot avoid this duty by saying 
he looked and did not see the bus. And the exces-
sive speed he attributes to the· bus, which he did 
not see, does not in the circumstances of this case 
excuse him for driving into its path. There was 
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no evidence upon which the last clear. ch~nce doc-
trine could have been applied. The District Court 
erred in denying appellant's motions. Upon re-
mand, the verdict and judgment thereon should 
be set aside and judgment should be entered for 
the defendant.'' 
Applying the standards of care and principles of 
law that are discussed in the foregoing authorities, it is 
clear that the plaintiff in this case was negligent as a 
matter of law and that such negligence proximately 
contributed to the collision if not the sole proximate 
cause by reason of definite undisputed facts as shown by 
this record. 
In an attempt to explain away the fact that plain-
tiff failed to see that which was apparent and obvious, 
the idea of ''distribution of attention'' is injected under 
the authority of Martin v. Stevens, ______ Utah ______ , 243 P. 
2d 747. That case involved giving some attention to mul-
tiple streets in an intersection. Here there is no sueh 
excuse. At the commencement of plaintiff's "U" turn 
her only consideration could have been in regard to th~ 
northbound traffic up to the time of impact "~hich oc-
curred in the easternmost lane for traffic traveling 
north. In this respect, this Court has already spoken 
on the subject in the case of Smith v. Bennett, 1 Utah 2d 
224, 265 Par. 2d 401. That case involved a pedestrian 
plaintiff ,,~ho was struck "~hile crossing the traffic lanes 
for eastbound traffic. In regard to the demands on 
plaintiff's attention the following language is used: 
"Plaintiff cites a series of cases illustrated by 
l\1artin v. SteYens, Utah, 243 P. 2d 747 ~ Lowder 
v. Holley, Utah, 233 P. 2d 350 ~ Poulsen v. ~{an-
10 
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ness, Utah, 241 P. 2d 152, in which the questions 
of contributory negligence and proximate cause 
were held to be jury questions. A major dissimi-
larity exists between the facts of the case now 
before the court and plaintiff's authorities. In 
these cases we were concerned with situations 
such as intersectional accidents where the plain-
tiff's attention was demanded in more than one 
direction or in more than one place. Since his 
attention could not be in all places and in all direc-
tions at once, it was a question of human judgment 
as to how his attention should be distributed 
among the several competing demands. A ques-
tion of fact for the jury was presented as to 
whether his distribution of attention was reason-
able. In the instant case there was but one demand 
upon plaintiff's attention. There is no room for a 
reasonable difference of opinion as to where her 
attention should have been concentrated; it was 
incumbent upon her to observe the condition of 
approaching traffic. That she failed to use due 
care in doing so is manifest from the evidence.'' 
The Smith case cites with approval, and all to the 
same effect, Mingus v. Olsen, 114 Utah 505, 201 Pac. 2d 
495; Sant v. Miller, 115 Utah 559, 206 Pac. 2d 719; and 
Cox v. Thompson, ______ Utah ______ , 254 Pac. 2d 1047. It is 
undisputed in this case (as a matter of fact, it was pre-
sented in plaintiff's case) that at the time plaintiff 
started her '' U'' turn that the Breeze vehicle was stopped 
at that very place (R. 67, 68), and plaintiff did not see 
it (R. 108, 119) nor did she see the car of defendant 
McKeever (R. 108, 119). This is exactly the principle 
discussed in the foregoing authorities. 
Appellant's brief discusses the activities of Officer 
Allred and Sec. 41-6-63, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and 
]] 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
it is most interesting. The Code provision requires a 
motorist to comply ,with a lawful order of a police officer. 
The conversatiQn and . arrangements were neither an 
order nor a lawful order and no exigency nor emergency 
existed. See West v. Cruz, 75 Ariz. 13, 251 Pac. 2d 311, 
and Falasco v. Hulen, 6 Cal. App. 2d 224, 44 Pac. 2d 469. 
Certainly, nothing of this sort could be apparent to the 
defendant McKeever, (R. 6, 16, 17, 18, 24). At the time 
of the collision Allred was way over on the west side of 
U.S. 91 facing and traveling south (R. 41). Nothing wa·s 
stated in word or acts that would relieve plaintiff from 
exercising due care. Quite the contrary, plaintiff was 
warned by Officer Allred when he stated, "Now, let's 
be careful. ' ' ( R. 4 7.) In no better language could plain-
tiff have been warned of the danger and hazards of the 
turn she attempted. Of course, the officer's judgment 
was lacking . He could have directed plaintiff to a safe 
and lawful place where the turn might have been made. 
It appears. upon a fair examination of this record 
that plaintiff's maneuver violated the provisions of Sec. 
41-6-67 and Sec. 41-6-69, .Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
and that such violations constitute negligence as a matter 
of law in addition to her lack of due care as previously 
discussed. 
It seems unnecessary to argue the element of proxi-
mate cause., In all of the foregoing authorities this ele· 
ment was under consideration. Not only ''yas the im-
proper '' U'' turn unanimously regarded as the proximate 
cause of the collision but in this case as in Gederlof v. 
Wh~ited, supra, it could properly be regarded as the sole 
12 
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proximate cause. 
Each and every authority cited by respondent is 
analagous, in point, and determinative of this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court stated in Walker v. Peterson, 3 Utah 2d 
54, 278 Pac. 2d 291, that "in all cases of collision, both 
drivers are required to exercise that degree of care 
which a reasonably prudent person under the circum-
stances would exercise for his own and others' safety, 
and where the failure of a party to meet this standard 
is a contributing cause of the accident, no relief can be 
had on his behalf." (Italics added.) The facts of this 
collision and accident clearly and without doubt show 
that plaintiff woefully failed to meet the standard of 
care as required by the statutes of this State and the 
pronouncements of this Court. 
Respondent submits that the judgment as it was 
finally entered by the trial court was the only proper 
judgment that could be so entered pursuant to law as it 
has been consistently determined by this Court. 
Therefore, we respectfully urge tha~ this Court sus-
tain and affirm the action of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH, ELTON & MANGUM 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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